Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Clyde Wade v. Linda Jobe : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clyde Wade; pro se.
Judith Mayorga, Bruce Plenk; Utal Legal Services; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wade v. Jobe, No. 890443.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2727

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

WW

UTAH SUPREME'COURT

OOCUME.NT
KFU '
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

09OHH3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE WADE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890443

LINDA JOBE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority 14 b

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

An appeal from the final judgment of the Second District
Court, Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
By: JUDITH MAYORGA #4630
385 - 24th Street, Suite 522
Ogden, Utah 84401
By: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CLYDE WADE, Pro Se
Plaintiff/Respondent
165 Orchard Ave.
Ogden, Utah 84404

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TlIE STATE OF UTAH

i. LYDE W^rr
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case
Defendant/Appellant,

Priority 14 b

BRIEI OF APPELLANT

An appeal rr..:--

no

Court,. Honorable Ronald

iiidgmen'

ne Second D i s t r i c t

presiding.

HT^ri LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
' ^ Defendant/Appellant
i

-

- ^J G

_ 322
i 84401
By: BRUCE LENh n~c.:
• .outh 40T Eas- Suite 400
Salt i>••
-v ~'*1 :

CLYDE I'i i: E
P • Se
Plain tiff, 'Respoi id = i i I:
165 Orchard Ave.
Ogden, Utah 84404

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATUTES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

6
POINT 1

THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS. .
POINT II. . . ,

6
APPLIES TO
6
13

THE RENTAL OF CONDEMNABLE PREMISES POSING A SUBSTANTIAL
DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE OCCUPANTS AND
UTILIZING A CONDEMNATION ORDER AS A MEANS OF EVICTION
ARE DECEPTIVE OR UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT,

13

POINT III

17

JOBE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES DUE TO LATENT DEFECTS THAT
RENDERED THE PREMISES UNINHABITABLE
CONCLUSION

16
20

APPENDIX
CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AMENDED JUDGMENT
UTAH CODE § 78-36-12

i

A-l
A-7
A-11
A-12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
49 Prospect Street v. Sheva Gardens, Inc., 227 N.J. Super.
449, 547 A.2d 1134 (1988)

11

Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563, (Colo. 1976)

19

Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d
831 (Mass. 1973)
Carter v. Mueller, 120 111. App.3d 314, 457 N.E.2d
1335 (1983)
Chelsea Plaza Homes v. Moore, 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d
1100 (1979)

19
11
12

Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa.450,
329 A.2d 812 (1974)
8-10, 13, 18
Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983)

. 11, 12

Green v. Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d
1168 (1974)

19

Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984)

19

Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 U.S. App.
D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071, 1074

10

King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973)

19

Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d
574 (1977)

11

McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 434 N.E„2d 1215 (1982)
Myers v. Ginsberg, 735 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App. 1987)

11, 12

. . . 11, 12

Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989)

13

P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 778 P.2d 11 (Utah App. 1989) . . .

6,

7, 11, 17
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985)

16

Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979)

19

ii

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896
(Utah 1989) . r . . .~: ~ . . . 7

13

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)

15

Rodriguez v. Barry Bi .,.-. . ^ .s^^. .
(W.D. Mich. 1987) .
".-"."."

...

Smolen v. Dahlman Apartment, L;
N.W.2d 892 (Mich. App. 1983)
S t a t e v.

d l M 1> M i n

Schvab,

109 W i s . 2 d

Taylor v. Leedy,

412 S o . I'd 7t,3

Wanland v.

Beavers,

I ' 1 II h

1^
ifi1 i

iw^h

State v. Weller,

11

i,6b,

.J./

N.W.2»I

(Al.i.

I M,

\ L.

11982)

.

.

- '>g2 i
Mil

11|

. . . .

STATUTES
Page
U t a h Code § 1 3 - 1 1 - 4 ( 2 ) ( b )
U t a h Code § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 II I I
Ill HII

C

(1M

'

I ' • \ I

'.it

I

beg

U t a h Code § 1 3 - 1 1 - 2
U t a h Code § 1 3 - 1 1 - 1 ( 2 )
111 rih i" ii li

M

I I

'i |

4, 6
I

U t a h Code § l i - l l - t i
U t a h Code $ 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2
M

i'

i

.1

'

'

i

U t a h Code fe J J - ] 1 -' 11 4)
U t a h Code & 1 3 - l l a - S
lit ,»h C~d> ' '

I

II M l

1*

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Page
Backman, James H., The Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of
Developments in Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law,
33 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1980)

9

R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant
111-12 (1980)

20

*W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 401
(4th ed. 1971)

18

IV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE WADE,

*

Plaintiff/Respondent,

*

v,

*

LINDA JOBE,
Defendant/Appellant.

*

Case No. 890443

*

Priority 14 b

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second District Court
in an action between a landlord and a tenant.

Jurisdiction is

proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
a) Whether, as a matter of law, residential rental agreements
are "consumer transactions" as defined by the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act.
b)

Whether

the

landlord

the

rental

violated

the

Consumer

Sales

Practices Act.
c)

Whether

of

condemnable

premises

posing

substantial health and safety hazards to the occupants is a
deceptive or unconscionable act under the Consumer Sales Practices
Act, and a violation thereof.
d)

Whether the renter is entitled to damages due to latent

defects that rendered the premises inhabitable.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about June 25, 1988, tenant (Jobe entered into a rental
agreement with landlord (Wade) for a single family dwelling at 2680
Adams Ave., Ogden, Utah (R. 103, Finding No. 1). Approximately two
weeks later, tenant arranged for water and electricity to be
connected at the premises and took possession (R. 104, Finding No.
3).

Jobe has three young children (R. 30).
Shortly thereafter, Jobe discovered that the kitchen and

bathroom faucets leaked, that the bathroom sink leaked, the toilet
frequently was clogged, and numerous light fixtures were inoperable
(Tr. 29, 30). Within a few days, the water heater malfunctioned.
When Jobe investigated, she learned that the flame of the water
heater had been extinguished by accumulated sewage and water in the
basement, which also produced a foul odor throughout the house (Tr.
34, 40, 42, 44).
Jobe notified landlord who came to the premises on numerous
occasions to pump out the sewage and water from the basement onto
the sidewalk (Tr. 34, 53). Each time after pumping, landlord relit
the water heater and it functioned for a short period of time until
the accumulated sewage and water extinguished the water heater
pilot light again. These and various other problems persisted

2

throughout July, August, September and October.

(Tr. 34, 42, 44,

46, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63)
In November, Jobe notified landlord that she would withhold
further rent until the sewage problem was permanently repaired (Tr*
24, 25). Landlord did not repair the sewage problem but contacted
Ogden City asking that the building be closed and Jobe be ordered
to vacate immediately (Tr. 57, 58, 59).

A building inspector

inspected the premises, declared it unsafe for human habitation on
December 13, 1988, based primarily on a disconnected sewer line and
raw sewage present in the basement, and ordered Jobe to vacate (Tr.
37-39, Defendant's Exhibits 6D & 7D).1 Jobe vacated immediately
(R. 104, Finding No. 4).
Landlord brought suit against Jobe for unpaid rent and a writ
of restitution in the Second Circuit Court of Weber County, Ogden
Department (R. 1). Jobe filed a counterclaim seeking an offset
against any rent owed due to the uninhabitable condition of the
premises and seeking damages, attorney's fees, and declaratory
relief under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Utah
Code § 13-11-1 et seq. (R. 11-16).

Jobe also filed a motion for

removal of the matter to the district court pursuant to Utah Code
§ 13-11-6, which motion was granted.

1

A default judgment against

A subsequent report (Defendant's Exhibit 6D) disclosed
numerous violations of both the Uniform Housing Code (UHC) and the
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings (UCADB).
3

landlord on Jobe's counterclaim was entered by the district court
on June 1, 1989, in the amount of $2r672. The default judgment was
subsequently set aside pursuant to a stipulation of the parties.
Trial was held on September 7, 1989, the Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde presiding. The court's Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Amended Judgment were entered on October 23, 1989
awarding landlord judgment of unpaid rent of $770, the full rent
due under the parties1 original agreement for Jobe's tenancy,2
denying any offsets and dismissing Jobe's counterclaim, holding
that the CSPA did not apply to landlord/tenant transactions and,
if it did, the landlord had not engaged in any deceptive or
unconscionable acts here (R. 103-107, Appendix).

This appeal

followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT APPLIES TO
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS.
A.

Clear language of the act.
1.

§ 13-11-3(2) defines consumer transaction as:
A sale, lease, assignment, award
by chance, or other written or
oral transfer or disposition of
goods,
services
or
other
property, both tangible and
intangible (except securities and
insurance), to a person for
primarily personal family or
household purposes. . . .
It

2

Landlord sued for $1,335 (R. 1) an amount far in excess of
what he was due under the parties1 agreement after deducting
payments by Jobe evidenced by landlord's signed receipts
(Defendant's Exhibits 1D-5D).
4

includes
any
offer
or
solicitation, any agreement any
performance of an agreement with
respect to any of these transfers
or dispositions . . .
The rental of a residence clearly falls within this
broad definition, and none of the Act's explicit
exemptions or exclusions applies.
B. Appropriate construction and purpose of the consumers
sales practices act supports application to residential
rental transactions.
§ 13-11-2 provides that: [the] act shall be construed
liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing consumer sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who
commit deceptive and unconscionable sales
practices;
(3)
to encourage the development of fair
consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales
practices not inconsistent with the policies of
the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to
consumer protection;
(5)
to make uniform the law, including the
administrative rules, with respect to the subject
to this act among those states which enact
similar laws; and
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in
good faith comply with the provisions of this
act. [emphasis added]
1. The modern view is that a renter is a consumer
purchasing a bundle of goods and services, rights and
obligations for exchange for rent. The goods and services
purchased are a well known package which includes not merely
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and a
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows
and doors, proper sanitation, proper maintenance, etc.
2. Federal precedent under the federal models for
consumer protection laws support a holding that the laws cover
the rental of residences.
3. Courts of most other states have construed their
consumer protection laws to apply to residential rental
transactions.
5

II.

THE RENTAL OF CONDEMNABLE PREMISES POSING A
SUBSTANTIAL DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF
THE OCCUPANTS AND UTILIZING A CONDEMNATION
ORDER AS A MEANS OF EVICTION ARE DECEPTIVE OR
UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE ACT.

A. An unconscionable act or practice occurring before,
during or after a [consumer] transaction is a violation. §
13-11-5(1).
B. The court should consider circumstances which the
supplier knew or had reason to know, § 13-11-5(3)
III. JOBE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES DUE TO LATENT
DEFECTS
THAT
RENDERED
THE
PREMISES
UNINHABITABLE.
A.

Utah should recognize a warranty of habitability.

B. P.H. Investment v. Oliver, holding that the doctrine
of caveat emptor prevents a renter from asserting an implied
warranty of habitability, should not be applied to
circumstances where the renter cannot detect unsafe,
hazardous, or non-functioning conditions upon reasonable
inspection before occupancy.
C. Liability of the renter for payment for the rented
premises should be offset or abated for periods during which
the plumbing, lighting, heating, or other normal functions of
the premises are inoperable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS.
The Utah

Consumer

ACT

Sales Practices Act

APPLIES

TO

(CSPA) prohibits

deceptive or unconscionable acts of a supplier in connection with
a consumer transaction.

Consumer transaction is broadly defined

in Utah Code § 13-11-3(2) as:
A sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods,
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible
(except securities and insurance), to a person for
6

primarily personal, family, or household
purposes. . . . It includes any offier or solicitation,
any agreement, any performance of an agreement with
respect to any of these transfers ox\ dispositions . . .
Rental of a residence falls comfortably within this definition,
since a lease is often involved. However, even without a formal
lease, the rental of a dwelling is a transaction by a consumer and
is probably the most important transaction made by consumers other
than the purchase of food.
fundamentally

affects

the

The acguisition of decent housing
consumer's

kell-being, health

and

personal sense of security.
Landlord/tenant relations are increasingly being analyzed as
contractual interactions and less as a transfer of a property
interest. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals recently declared
the rental of housing to be a consumer transaction:
. . . housing today is a product bcpught by consumers,
although its purchasers receive much less legal
protection than purchasers of othef products. There
seems to be no functional reason why the remedies for the
sale of defective rental housing should be so much less
than those for the sale of defective goods or services,
and the importance of shelter as a necessity of life
makes that disparity seem all the more anomalous.""
The Act itself, Utah Code § 13-11-2, provides further guidance
as to its construction and purpose:
This act shall be construed liberall|y to promote
the following policies:
(1)
to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing consumer sales practices; . . .
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices
not inconsistent with the policies o£ the Federal Trade
Commission Act relating to consumer protection; . . .
3

P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 778 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah App. 1989),
cert, granted, (Utah Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 1989 (No. 890357), citations
omitted.
7

(5) to make uniform the law, . . . ajnong those states
which enact similar laws; . . .
Consumer transaction is given a broad definition limited by the
specific exclusions therein and the exemptions of specific types
of transactions enumerated in § 13-lla-5. The Act should therefore
be construed to include all consumer transactions except those
explicitly excluded.
Practices Act to

The application of the Utah Consumer Sales

residential

rental transactions

is wholely

consistent with the purposes of the Act. Actually, the modern view
of a residential rental transaction sees today's tenant as a
consumer much like one who purchases a refrigerator or leases a
car.
In addition, the overwhelming weight of authority from both
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) precedent* and case law from other
states indicate that rental of a residence should be viewed as a
consumer transaction under the Utah Act.

A local commentator,

Brigham Young University Professor James H. Backman agrees. "It may
well be that the residential tenant is the ultimate consumer. No
other form of general consumption can match the expense, the

4

See FTC cases collected and analyzed in Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa.450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974), 819820.
"No support in the federal precursors of the
Consumer Protection Law can be found for an
exclusion for leasing from the Law's broad
prohibition of unfair and deceptive practices in
market transactions. On the other hand, the
legislative history of, decisions interpreting,
and FTC proceedings under section 5 of the FTC
Act strongly counsel that the leasing of housing
is covered by the Consumer Protection Law."
8

necessity, or the impact of housing on individuals. . . . Housing,
like food and basic clothing, is indispehsable . . . there is no
valid reason to distinguish consumer contracts and the contracts
of tenants in the form of a residential lease."

Backman, The

Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law
and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1980).
This law is based closely on a model &ct, the Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act, approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners

on

Uniform

State

Laws

and

the

American

Bar

Association in 1970 and 1971. This act and another similar uniform
act, the Uniform Deceptive Practices Act, have been adopted in
fifteen states. Our act was intended to be consistent with the law
of other states adopting similar laws. Mo$t state courts presented
with the question have found that rental of a residence is a
consumer transaction falling within the ambit of that state's
consumer protection laws.

Utah should jo|Ln this trend.

A leading case on the application of consumer protection laws
to the landlord tenant context is Commonwealth v. Monumental
Properties, Inc.5

There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held

that the Pennsylvania consumer protection law, which prohibited
unfair or deceptive practices in trade or commerce, applied to a
lease of residential property.

The court reached this conclusion

notwithstanding the fact that the Pennsylvania statute does not
specifically mention

s

leasing, and

Idi, 329 A.2d 812.
9

based

its holding

on the

contemporary view of residential leases, a pragmatic and functional
approach to the legislation and the consequences of a holding to
the contrary.e
The court noted that the modern apartment dweller is a
consumer

of housing

services

and adopted

the

"now classic"

description of this economic reality appearing in Javins v. First
National Realty Corp.;
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek
" shelter^ , today, they seek a well known package of goods
and services - a package which includes not merely walls
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance.7
The court reasoned that the "purchaser of this bundle is as
much a consumer as is the purchaser of an automobile, household
appliance, or any other consumer goods.8 The court also noted that
its interpretation of the consumer protection law was consistent
with judicial and administrative interpretations of its federal
precursor, the Federal Trade Commission Act, a position agreed to
by the FTC which filed an amicus brief in that case.3
North Carolina, Illinois, Texas, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Wisconsin, and both state and federal courts in

6

Id^, 329 A.2d at 820.

7

Id., 329 A.2d at 820, citing Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., 138 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071, 1074, cert, denied,
400 U.S. 925, 91 S. Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185 (1970).
8

Commonwealth 329 A.2d at 821.

9

Id., 329 A.2d at 818 - 20.
10

Michigan have reached a similar conclusion. See, Love v. Pressley,
34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), appeal dismissed 294 N.C.
441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978); Carter v. Mueller, 120 111. App.3d 314,
457 N.E.2d 1335 (1983); Myers v. Ginsberg, 735 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.
App. 1987); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983);
McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 434 N.E.2d 1215 (1982); 49>
Prospect Street v. Sheva Gardens, Inc., 227 N.J. Super. 449, 547
A.2d 1134 (1988); State v. Weller, 109 Wis.2d 665, 327 N.W.2d 172
(1982); Smolen v. Dahlman Apartment, Ltd., 417 Mich. 1100, 338
N.W.2d 892 (Mich. App. 1983); Rodriguez v. parry Brook Farms, Inc.,
672 F.Supp. 1009 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
Two

states have held

that comprehensive

landlord/tenant

statutes precluded action under their consumer protection laws for
deceptive acts by a landlord.

In State v. Schwab, 693 P. 2d 108

(Wash. 1985), the Supreme Court of Washington allowed recovery for
city housing code violations under its landlord/tenant act/° but
dismissed the state attorney general's complaint under its consumer
protection statute seeking a determination that violations of its
landlord/tenant

act were per

se violations

of

its consumer

protection law. The court found that the landlord/tenant statute
was intended by the legislature to be all encompassing and that the
Washington consumer protection law, with a very specific and
inclusionary definition list, (unlike Utah's broad definition) did
not specifically include landlord/tenant relations. Because Utah

10

Utah has so far failed to grant such relief to its tenants.
See P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 778 P.3d 11, 14.
11

has no comparable comprehensive landlord/tenant

statute, this

reasoning is of little precedential value for Utah.
The Supreme

Court of Kansas has also held

the state's

landlord/tenant statute displaces the consumer protection law in
Chelsea Plaza Homes v. Moore, 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d 1100 (1979).
The court reviewed the legislative history of the landlord/tenant
statute in its analysis and found that it was intended to cover all
the obligations, rights and remedies of both landlord and tenants.
Since the landlord/tenant statute was more specific, the court
found that it should override the less specific coverage of the
consumer protection law.

Again, since Utah has no comprehensive

landlord/tenant statute, and in fact no statute at all dealing with
obligations, rights or remedies of either landlord or tenant, this
analysis is not helpful here.
At least four states (in Myers, Conaway, McGrath, and Smolen,
cited

above) have applied their consumer protection laws to

landlord/tenant
comprehensive

relations

notwithstanding

landlord/tenant

the

existence

statutes in those states.

of
The

consumer protection laws provide complementary protection for
deceptive or unconscionable acts which cannot be anticipated by the
legislature.

The House Conference Report that accompanied the

original passage of the FTC Act is instructive here.
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all
unfair practices.
There is no limit to human
inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair
practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it
would be at once necessary to begin over again. If

12

Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would
undertake an endless task. H.R. Co^f. Rep. No. 1142,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).11
The trial court's conclusion that the ptah CSPA does not apply
to landlord tenant agreements (R. 105, Conclusion No. 4) is subject
to review for correctness here.

Nephi Cijty v. Hansen, 779 P.2d

673, 674 (Utah 1989). That conclusion constitutes an error of law
and should be reversed by this court.
statutory

analysis

or

on

public

Whether based simply on

poli<py,

applying

consumer

protection statutes to landlord tenant relations is consistent with
the trend in this court which has recognizee! the contractual nature
of such relations (see, e.g., Reid v. Mutjual of Omaha Insurance
Co. , 776 P.2d 896, 902 n.3 (Utah 1989)) ancfl with decisions in the
overwhelming majority of other jurisdiction^ which have considered
this issue, and is necessary to protect tenants in this state.

POINT II.
THE RENTAL OF CONDEMNABLE PREMISES POSING A SUBSTANTIAL
DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE OCCUPANTS AND
UTILIZING A CONDEMNATION ORDER AS A MEANS OF EVICTION
ARE DECEPTIVE OR UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACTn
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act prohibits deceptive or
unconscionable acts by suppliers.'2 Here Wade, a supplier (R. 103,
Finding No. 2), rented premises that he knety or had reason to know

11

Cited in Commonwealth 329 A.3d at 83j8.

17

§ 13-11-5(1) provides that an unconscionable act or practice
accruing before, during, or after a transaction is a violation.
§ 13-11-5(3) provides that the court should consider circumstances
which the supplier knew or had reason to know.
13

had a serious plumbing problem, namely a nonexistent or inadequate
sewer connection and numerous other problems. These problems
existed throughout Jobe's tenancy (Tr. 29, 42).

Witness Diane

Copeland, an Ogden City building inspector, as well as Jobe herself
testified with respect to the extent and duration of the problems
on the property (Tr. 34, 38). The trial court found that Jobe's
tenancy terminated on December 13, 1988, when the premises were
found to be unsafe for human occupation (Tr. 40, R. 104, Finding
No. 4). On that day Wade was pumping raw sewage from Jobe's
basement into the street (Tr. 37). Apparently he even realized the
seriousness of the condition, since he testified that nthe place
wasn't sanitary at that point on" (Tr. 57). Landlord's duty at
this point was to immediately repair the problem and restore the
premises to a fit condition.

His failure to do so constitutes a

deceptive or unconscionable act or practice under CSPA.
The trial court found that "the evidence would not warrant a
finding of any deceptive act or practice on the part of the
landlord, as contemplated by the Consumer Sales Practices Act" (R.
105, Conclusion No. 5). 1 3 Yet renting an apartment with problems
of this severity and refusing to fix the most disturbing problem,
the accumulation of raw sewage in the basement to a depth that
extinguished the water heater, is deception. The CSPA provides an
example of a deceptive act which may be relevant here:

if a

Utah
Code
§
13-11-5(2)
provides
that
"[t]he
unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for
the court."
14

supplier "indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is
of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it
is not,n the supplier has engaged in a deceptive act.
§ 13-11-4(2)(b).

Utah Code

Renting an apartment includes a representation

implied or actual that there will not be standing water full of raw
sewage in the basement, that there will be hot water and that there
will not be foul odors permeating the residence. Landlord failed
to disclose the existence of these problems and failed to repair
them when brought to his attention.

His actions are no different

than the shady used car dealer who knows of but "forgets" to advise
a consumer that the transmission is seriou$ly defective on a used
car which is for sale. That is clearly a deceptive act. So are the
landlord's activities here.
It also seems apparent that the landlord's failure to repair
the

major

health

hazard

present,

the

sewage

problem,

is

unconscionable. Landlord testified that he is a plumber (Tr. 56)
and is intimately familiar with the building. He claimed that he
made efforts to repair the problem but finally gave up and called
the building inspector and "ordered them to condemn the place so
she would move out" (Tr. 57). These acts must surely shock the
conscious of the court.

An unconscionable contract has been

defined by the Utah courts as one in which Mno decent, fair minded
person would view the ensuing result without being possessed of a
profound sense of injustice." Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985)
citations omitted.
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Likewise, and perhaps even more offensive, is the landlord's
direct admission that he did not fix the sewage problem, called the
Ogden City Inspection Department and "ordered them" to condemn the
property because he "wanted her to be out in a hurry" (Tr. 57).
He succeeded. The trial court found that she was evicted on
December 13, 1988 by the Ogden City Inspection Division (R. 105,
Conclusion No. 2). This abuse of the building inspection process
and admitted conscious decision to evade the statutory eviction
procedures is also both deceptive and unconscionable. Such actions
clearly violate Utah Code § 78-36-121* and the public policy to
avoid self-help evictions articulated in Pentecost v. Harward, 699
P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985).

Since the act provides that the

unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for
the courts, this court is free to review the record and make its
own determination with respect to this issue.
Jobe is entitled to the relief provided in the act 1S for these
deceptive and unconscionable acts of the landlord.
should reverse the trial court's determination

This court

that none of

landlord's actions were deceptive or unconscionable.

1A

Utah Code § 78-36-12 provides that:
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully
exclude a tenant from the tenant's premises in
any manner except by judicial process . . .

AS

§§ 13-11-19(2) and (5).
16

POINT III,
JOBE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES DUE TO LATENT DEFECTS THAT
RENDERED THE PREMISES UNINHABITABLE.
Having lived above a virtual cess po01 for a period of five
months, and enduring "a couple of dozen" substandard conditions
"varying from minor to significant enough to require the place to
be vacated" (Tr. 39) , Jobe was charged by tlie trial court with full
payment of rent for the entire period of her tenancy.

The court

apparently relied on P.H. Investment v. Ojliver, which held that
Utah does not recognize an implied warranty of habitability in
residential rental agreements but instead continues to endorse the
doctrine of caveat emptor. The most shocking implication of the
trial court's decision is that even the efforts that the landlord
did make to remedy the problem, pumping th$ raw sewage out of the
basement into the street on several occasions so that the water
heater could be relit, was not required und^r the law. He need not
have done anything at all until cited by the building inspector and
even then would apparently be entitled to Collect full rent from
Jobe.
The trial court determined that Jobers liability for rent
commenced on July 14, 1988 and terminated on December 13, 1988,
when she was ordered to vacate by the building inspector but denied
her any offsets in her rental obligation (H. 104-5, Finding No. 8
and Conclusion No. 6). Tenant's only solution to these problems was

17

to move, incurring the substantial investment in time, energy, and
money which a move requires.

Yet there is ample authority under

the common law to afford her some relief.
In connection with its discussion of unfair and deceptive
practices, the Commonwealth court cited Dean Prosser for the
proposition that:
The lessor, like a vendor, is under the obligation to
disclose to the lessee concealed dangerous conditions
existing when possession is transferred, of which he has
knowledge. There is "something like fraud1' in a failure
to give warning of a known hidden danger to one who
enters upon the assumption that it does not exist; and
the lessor will be liable to the lessee or to members of
his family for his non-disclosure.
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 401 (4th ed. 1971).
It is highly unlikely that the landlord, a plumber (Tr. 56),
was unaware of the numerous plumbing and other problems cited by
the building inspector when he rented the apartment to tenant. It
is a much more reasonable interpretation of the facts that these
conditions were known to him when the tenant inspected the premises
and throughout her tenancy.

Especially with regard to the sewer

connection problem, Jobe should not be responsible for this problem
since the water was not connected at the time the rental agreement
was entered into (R. 104, Finding No. 3, Tr. 30-31).
This court should recognize a warranty of habitability in Utah
and determine tenant's rent obligation to landlord, if any, after
offsetting all contractual defense claims that tenant may have.
A large number of other state courts have recognized a warranty of
habitability

and have explored a tenant's contract remedies,
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concluding that among others, tenants should be allowed to claim
a retroactive rent abatement or other damages for a landlord's
failure to comply with applicable building and health codes. See
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); ^oston Housing Authority
v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); ^>ugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d
897 (Pa. 1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984); and
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973).
Alternatively, but clearly less satisfactory, this court
should make a judicial exception to the dolctrine of caveat emptor
where conditions affecting habitability ar0 not readily detectable
by the tenant.

Here, for example, there was no way for Jobe to

know at the time she entered into the rental agreement that there
was a defective sewer connection. And even during her tenancy,
there was no way by ordinary inspection to determine the reason
that she was without hot water and forced to live with offensive
odors.
Even in the few states that continue to endorse caveat emptor
such an exception has been made "where the defect was allegedly
unknown to the tenant, was known to the landlord, and was not
ascertainable upon ordinary inspection" B^ackwell v. Del Bosco,
558 P.2d 563, 565 n.l (Colo. 1976).le

Applying this analysis,

tenants have been awarded damages under usual contract remedy
theories, the most common being the benefit of the bargain rule,

16

See also Wanland v. Beavers, 474 N.E.2d 1327 (111. App.
1985) and Taylor v. Leedy, 412 So.2d 763 (Ala. 1982).
19

awarding the difference between what the tenant actually received
and what should have been received. See R. Schoshinski, American
Law of Landlord and Tenant 111-12 (1980).

Here that would have

been an offset based on the rental value of an apartment with hot
water and a normally functioning toilet and without dangerous
electrical and other problems and offensive odors, compared to what
Jobe received here.

CONCLUSION
The language of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, case
law from other states, prior related decisions of this court and
sound

public

policy

all

dictate

that

the

Act

apply

to

landlord/tenant agreements and relations.
This court should determine that the rental of premises which
are

in substantial

violation

of building

codes

and pose a

substantial hazard to the health and safety to its occupants and
the use of the building inspection and closure process to evict a
tenant constitute deceptive or unconscionaible acts or practices
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.

Jobe is entitled to

damages pursuant to the Act.
In the alternative, Jobe is entitled to an offset against any
rent owed to compensate her for the numerous building code
violations, where the

conditions were not readily detectable by

her and were known to landlord, either under a theory of breach of
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the landlord's implied warranty of habitability or as an exception
to the rule of caveat emptor.

The judgment of the district court

should be reversed.
DATED this
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Section
13-11-6.

Jurisdiction of district courts — Service
of process.
13-11-7.
Duties of enforcing authority — Confidentiality of identity of persons investigated — Civil penalty for violation
of restraining or injunctive orders.
13-11-8.
Powers of enforcing authority.
13-11-9.
Rule-making requirements.
13-11-10 to 13-11-15. Repealed.
13-11-16.
Investigatuiv powers of enforcing authority.
13-11-17.
Actions by enforcing authority.
13-11-17.5. Costs and attorney's fees.
13-11-18.
Noncompliance by supplier subject to
other state supervision — Co-operation of enforcing authority and other
official or agency.
13-11-19.
Actions by consumer.
13-11-20.
Class actions.
13-11-21.
Settlement of cla^s action — Complaint
in class action delivered to enforcing
authority.
13-11-22.
Exemptions from application of act.
13-11-23.
Other lemedies available-- Class action
only as pi escribed by act.

13-11-1. Citation of act.
This act shall be known and may he cited as the
"Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act."
1»73
13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act.
This act shall be construed libeially to promote the
following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing consumer sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who
commit deceptive and unconscionable bales practices;
(3) to encourage the development o( fair consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state negulation of consumer sales
practices not inconsistent with the policies of the
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection;
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with respect to the subject of
this act among those states which enact similar
laws; and
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in
good faith comply with the provisions of this act.
1W73

CHAPTER 11
CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
Section
13-11-1.
13-11-2.
13-11-3.
13-11-4.
13-11-5.

Citation of act.
Construction and purposes of act.
Definitions.
Deceptive act or practice by supplier.
Unconscionable act or practice by supplier.

13-11-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly or indirectly for money, credit,
property, financial assistance, or any other thing
of value on the plea or representation that it will
be used for a charitable purpose. A charitable
solicitation may be made in any manner, including:
(a) any oral or written request, including
a telephone request;
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting
of any handbill, written advertisement, ur
publication;
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or
request of donations for any book, card,
chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, ticket,
flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token,
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other
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article in connection with which any appeal
is made for any charitable purpose, or where
the name of any charitable organization or
movement is used or referred to as an inducement or reason for making any purchase
donation, or where, in connection with any
sale or donation, any statement is made that
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any
sale or donation will go to or be donated to
any charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete when made,
whether or not the organization or person
making the solicitation receives any contribution or makes any sale.
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale,
lease, assignment, award by chance, or other
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods,
services, or other property, boih tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to a
person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes that relate to a
business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property and his personal
services on a continuing basis and in which he
has not been previously engaged, or a solicitation
or offer by a supplier with respect to any of these
transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of
an agreement with respect to any of these transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section.
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division
of Consumer Protection.
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that determines
the rights of the parties and concerning which
appellate remedies have been exhausted or the
time for appeal has expired.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
government,
governmental
subdivision
or
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, cooperative, or any other legal entity.
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor,
offeror, broker, or other person who jegularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the
consumer.
1987
13-11-4. Deceptive act or p r a c t i c e by supplier.
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates this
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the
supplier, with intent to deceive:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has
been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction is available to (he consumer for a
reason that does not exist;
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(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction has been supplied in accordance with
a previous representation, if it has not;
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer
transaction will be supplied in greater quantity
than the supplier intends;
(g) ind cates that replacement or repair is
needed, if it is not;
(h) ind cates that a specific price advantage
exists, if it does not;
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation he does not have;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty
terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if
the representation is false;
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a
rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in
return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if
receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event
occurring after the consumer enters into the
transaction;
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within the lime advertised or otherwise
represented or, if no specific time is advertised or
represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the
services within 30 days, unless within the applicable time] period the supplier provides the buyer
with the olption to either cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier or to extend the shipping
date to a specific date proposed by the supplier,
but any refund shall be mailed or delivered to the
buyer within ten business days after the seller
receives written notification from the buyer of
the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement
and receive the refund;
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's
right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within
three business days at the time of purchase if the
sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business pursuant to the supplier's
mail, telephone, or personal contact and if the
sale price pxceeds $25, which notice shall be a
conspicuous statement written in bold type, in
immediate I proximity to the space reserved for
the signature of the buyer, as follows: "YOU,
THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE
DATE OF THE TRANSACTION.";
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in
a pyramid Scheme as defined under Chapter 6a,

Title 76; oJ(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable solicitation will
be donated or used for a particular purpose or
will be donated to or used by a particular organization, if th<t representation is false.
i»87
13-11-5.

Unconscionable act or practice by supplier
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier
in connection with a consumer transaction violates
this act whether! it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
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(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is
Unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to
know.

1973

13-11-6.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of district c o u r t s — Service of p r o c e s s .
(1) The district courts of this state have jurisdiction over any supplier as to any act or practice in this
state governed by this act or as to any claim arising
from a consumer transaction subject to this act.
(2) In addition to any other method provided by
rule or statute, personal jurisdiction over a supplier
may be acquired in a civil action or proceeding instituted in the district court by the service of process in
the following manner. If a supplier engages in any act
or practice in this state governed by this act, or engages in a consumer transaction subject to this act, he
may designate an agent upon whom service of process
may be made in this state. The agent must be a resident of or a corporation authorized to do business in
this state. The designation muni he in writing and
filed with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. If no designation is made and filed, or if
process cannot be served in this state upon the designated agent, whether or not the supplier is a resident
of this state or is authorized to do business in this
state, process may be served upon the director of the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, but
service upon him is not effective unless the plaintiff
promptly mails a copy of the process and pleadings by
registered or certified mail to the defendant at his
last reasonably ascertainable address. An affidavit of
compliance with this section must be filed with the
clerk of the court on or before the return day of the
process, if any, or within any future time the court
allows.

i984

13-11-7.

Duties of enforcing a u t h o r i t y — Confidentiality of identity of p e r s o n s investigated — Civil p e n a l t y for violation of
r e s t r a i n i n g o r injunctive o r d e r s .
(1) The enforcing authority shall:
(a) enforce this chapter throughout the state;
(b) cooperate with state and local officials, officials of other states, and officials of the federal
government in the administration of comparable
statutes;
(c) inform consumers and suppliers on a continuing basis of the provisions of this chapter and
of acts or practices that violate this chapter including mailing information concerning final
judgments to persons who request it, for which he
may charge a reasonable fee to cover the expense;
(d) receive and act on complaints; and
(e) maintain a public file of final judgments
rendered under this chapter that have been either reported officially or made available for public dissemination under Subsection (l)(c), final
consent judgments, and to the extent the enforcing authority considers appropriate, assurances
of voluntary compliance.
(2) In carrying out his duties, the enforcing authority may not publicly disclose the identity of a person
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investigated unless his identify has become a matter
of public record in an enforcement proceeding or he
has consented to public disclosure.
(3) On motion of the enforcing authority, or on its
own motion, the court may impose a civil penalty of
not more than $5,000 for each day a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction issued under this chapter is violated,
if the supplier received notice of the restraining or
injunctive order. Civil penalties imposed under this
section shall be paid to the General Fund.
19S7
13-11-8. P o w e r s of enforcing a u t h o r i t y .
(1) The enforcing authority may conduct research,
hold public hearings, make inquiries, and publish
studies relating to consumer sales acts or practices.
(2) The enforcing authority shall adopt substantive
rules that prohibit with specificity acts or practices
that violate Section 13-11-4 and appropriate procedural rules.
1973
13-11-9. R u l e - m a k i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s .
(1) In addition to complying with other rule-making requirements imposed by this act, the enforcing
authority shall:
(a) adopt as a rule a description of the organization of his office, stating the general course and
method of operation of his office and method
whereby the public may obtain information or
make submissions or requests;
(b) adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal
procedures available, including a description of
the forms and instructions used by the enforcing
authority of his office; and
(c) make available for public inspection all
rules, written statements of policy, ami interpretations formulated, adopted, or used by the enforcing authority in discharging his functions.
(2) A rule of the enforcing authority is invalid, and
may not be invoked by the enforcing authority for
any purpose, until it has been made available for public inspection under Subsection »1>. This provision
does not apply to a person who has knowledge of a
rule before engaging in an act or practice that violates this act.
1973
13-11-10 to 13-11-15. R e p e a l e d .
13-11-16.

19S3,19S8

I n v e s t i g a t o r y p o w e r s of enforcing authority.
(1) If, by his own inquiries or as a result of complaints, the enforcing authority has reason to believe
that a person has engaged in, U engaging in, or is
about to engage in an act or practice that violates this
act, he may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses or matter, and colled evidence.
(2) If matter that the enforcing authority subpoenas is located outside this stale, the person subpoenaed may either make it available to the enforcing authority at a convenient location within the
state or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses
for the enforcing authority or his representative to
examine the matter at the place where it is located.
The enforcing authority may designate representatives, including officials of the state in which the matter is located, to inspect the matter on his behalf, and
he may respond to similar requests from officials of
other states.
(3) Upon failure of a person without lawful excuse
to obey a subpoena and upon reasonable notice to all
persons affected, the enforcing authonty may apply
to the court for an order compelling compliance.
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(4) The enforcing authority may request that an
individual who refuses to comply with a subpoena on
the ground that testimony or matter may incriminate
him be ordered by the court to provide the testimony
or matter. Except in a prosecution for perjury, an individual who complies with a court order to provide
testimony or matter after asserting a privilege
against self-incrimination to which he is entitled by
law, may not be subjected to a criminal proceeding or
to a civil penalty to the transaction concerning which
he is required to testify or produce relevant matter.
This subsection does not apply to damages recoverable under Section 13-11-19(2) or to civil sanctions
imposed under Section 13-11-17(1 Kb).
1973
13-11-17. Actions by enforcing a u t h o r i t y .
(1) The enforcing authority may bring an action:
(a) to obtain a declaratory judgment that an
act or practice violates this chapter;
(b) to enjoin, in accordance with the principles
of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this chapter;
and
(c) to recover, for each violation, actual damages, or obtain relief under Subsection (2)(b), on
behalf of consumers who complained to the enforcing authority within a reasonable time after
it instituted proceedings under this chapter.
(2) (a) The enforcing authority may bring a class
action on behalf of consumers for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter in a rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Section I Subsection]
13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on
which the action is based, or declared to violate
Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by final judgment of
courts of general jurisdiction and appellate
courts of this state that was either reported officially or made available for public dissemination
under Section [Subsectionl 13-1 l-7(l)(c) by the
enforcing authority ten days before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based, or,
with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was
prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent
judgment that became final before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based.
(b) On motion of the enforcing authority and
without bond in an action under this subsection,
the court may make appropriate orders, including appointment of a master or receiver or sequestration of assets, but only if it appears that
the defendant is threatening or is about to remove, conceal or dispose of his property to the
damage of persons for whom relief is requested,
to reimburse consumers found to have been damaged, or to carry out a transaction in accordance
with consumers' reasonable expectations, or to
strike or limit the application of unconscionable
clauses of contracts to avoid an unconscionable
result, or to grant other appropriate relief. The
court may assess the expenses of a master or receiver against a supplier.
(c) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and damages can
be computed with reasonable certainty, damages
recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot
• be located with due diligence shall be transferred
to the state treasurer pursuant to the Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
(d) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of
• the evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
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maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid the error, recovery under this subsection is
limited |to the amount, if any, by which the supplier wks unjustly enriched by the violation.
(e) No action may be brought by the enforcing
authority under this subsection more than two
years after the occurrence of a violation of this
chapter.
(3) The enforcing authority may terminate an investigation 6r an action other than a class action
upon acceptance of the supplier's written assurance of
voluntary compliance with this chapter. Acceptance
of an assurance may be conditioned on a commitment
to reimburse consumers or take other appropriate
corrective action. An assurance is not evidence of a
prior violation of this chapter. Unless an assurance
has been rescinded by agreement of the parties or
voided by a ccburt for good cause, subsequent failure to
comply with ^he terms of an assurance is prima facie
evidence of a violation.
19HJ
13-11-17.5. p o s t s and attorney's fees.
Any judgment granted in favor of the enforcing authority in connection with the enforcement of this
chapter shall include, in addition to any other monetary award or injunctive relief, an award of reasonable attorneyfs [cts, court costs, and costs of investigation.
19*7
13-11-18.

N o n c o m p l i a n c e b y s u p p l i e r subject to
o t h e r s t a t e s u p e r v i s i o n — Co-operation of enforcing a u t h o r i t y a n d other
official o r a g e n c y .
(1) If the enforcing authority received a complaint
or other information relating to noncompliance with
this act by a sjupplier who is subject to other supervision in this state, the enforcing authority shall inform the official or agency having that supervision.
The enforcing authority may request information
about suppliers from the official or agency.
(2) The enforcing authority and any other official
or agency in this state having supervisory authority
over a supplier shall consult and assist each other in
maintaining Compliance with this act. Within the
scope of their authority, they may jointly or separately make investigations, prosecute suits, and take
other official aption they consider appropriate.
1&73
13-11-19. Actions by c o n s u m e r .
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or
otherwise has Ian adequate remedy at law, a consumer may br^ng an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act
or practice violates this chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of
equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating,
or is likely to violate this chapter.
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a
violation of thjs chapter may recover, but not in a
class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is
greater, plus court costs.
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy at law, he
may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an
injunction, andi appropriate ancillary relief against
an act or practice that violates this chapter.
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a
violation of] this chapter may bring a class action
for the actiial damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter by a rule
adopted by the enforcing authority under Section
(Subsectionl 13-11-8(2) before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based, or de-
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clared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a
final judgment of the appropriate court or courts
of genera) jurisdiction and appellate courts of
this state that was either officially reported or
made available for public dissemination under
Section ISubsectionl 13 ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten days before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based, or with
respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became final before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages
can be computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid the error, recovery under this section is
limited to the amount, if any, in which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing
authority, the court may award to the prevailing
party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the woik
reasonably performed if
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or
practice that violates this chapter has brought or
maintained an action he knew to be groundless,
or a supplier has committed an act or practice
that violates this chaptei, and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the court
to be settled under Section ISubsectionl
13 ll-21(l)(a)
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor of the enforcing authority under Section 13-11 17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is
based in later proceedings under this section against
the same person or a person in privity with him
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes
final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy to the
enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file
maintained under Section (Subsectionl 13 11 7(1 He)
(8) An action under this section must be brought
within two years after occurrence of a violation of this
chapter, or within one year after the termination of
proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect
to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later
When a supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a
counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising
out of the transaction on which suit is brought
IBS3
13-11-20. Class actions.
(1) An action may be maintained as a class action
under this act only if
(a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable,
(b) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class,
(c) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are t> pical of the claims or defenses of the
class,
(d) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class, and
(e) either

13-11-20

(l) the prosecution of separate actions by
or against individual meinbeis of the class
would create a riak ot
(aa) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish
lncompat ble standaids of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(bb) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that
would as a practical matter dispose of
the interests of the other members not
parties tc the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests, or
(u) the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as
a whole, or
(in) the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the membeis of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a
class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contioversy
(2) The matters pertinent to the findings under
Subsection (l)(e)(iiu include
(a) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions,
(b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class,
(c) the desirability or undesirabihty of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action
(3) As soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the couit shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained
An order under this subsection may be conditional,
and it may be amended before decision on the merits
(4) In a class action maintained under Subsection
(l)(e) the court may direct to the members of the class
the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to each member who can
be identified through reasonable effort '1 he notice
shall advise each member that
(a) the court will exclude him from the class,
unless he requests inclusion, by a specified date,
(b) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who request inclusion,
and
(c) a member who requests inclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance thiough his counsel
(5) When appropriate, an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class
(6) In the conduct of a class action the court may
make appropriate orders
(a) determining the course of proceedings or
prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition
or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument,
(b) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct
of the action, that notice be given in the manner
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the court directs to some or all of the members or
to the enforcing authority of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or
of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(c) imposing conditions on the representative
parties or on intervenors;
(d) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; or
(e) dealing with similar procedural matters.
(7) A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court. Notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class as the court directs.
(8) The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under Subsection (l)(e)(i) or (ii), whether
or not favorable to the class, shall describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in a class action under Subsection (D(eHiii),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subsection (d) was directed, and who have requested inclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
Class.

1974
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Settlement of class action — Complaint in class action delivered to enforcing authority.
(1) (a) A defendant in a class action may file a
written offer of settlement. If it is not accepted
within a reasonable time by a plaintiff class representative, the defendant may file an affidavit
reciting the rejection. The court may determine
that the offer has enough merit to present to the
members of the class. If it so determines, it shall
order a hearing to determine whether the offer
should be approved. It shall give the best notice
of the hearing that is practicable under the circumstances, including notice to each member
who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall specify the terms of the offer and
a reasonable period within which members of the
class who request it are entitled to be included in
the class. The statute of limitations for those who
are excluded pursuant to this subsection is tolled
for the period the class action has been pending,
plus an additional year.
(b) If a member who has previously lost an opportunity to be excluded from the class is excluded at his request in response to notice of the
offer of settlement during the period specified under Paragraph (a), he may not thereafter participate in a class action for damages respecting the
same consumer transaction, unless the court
later disapproves the offer of settlement or approves a settlement materially different from
that proposed in the original offer of settlement.
Alter the expiration of the period of limitations, a
member of the class is not entitled to be excluded
from it.
(c) If the court later approves the offer of settlement, including changes, if any, required by
the court in the interest of a just settlement of
the action, it shall enter judgment, which is binding on all persons who are then members of the
class. If the court disapproves the offer or approves a settlement materially different from
that proposed in the original offer, notice shall be
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given to a person who was excluded from the action at his request in response to notice of the
offer uncker paragraph (a), and he is entitled to
rejoin the class and, in the case of the approval,
participate in the settlement.
(2) On thei commencement of a class action under
Section 13-11-19, the class representative shall mail
by certified n)ail with return receipt requested or personally serve! a copy of the complaint on the enforcing
authority. W|ithin thirty days after the receipt of a
copy of the cimplaint, but not thereafter, the enforcing authority may intervene in the class action. 1973
13-11-22. Exemptions from application of act
(1) This ac|t does not apply to:
(a) an I act or practice required or specifically
permitted by or under federal law, or by or under
state law;
(b) a publisher, broadcaster, printer, or other
person engaged in the dissemination of information or tpe reproduction of printed or pictorial
matter so far as the information or matter has
been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of
others without actual knowledge that it violated
this act;.
(c) claim for personal injury or death or claim
for damage to property other than the property
that is the subject of the consumer transaction;
(d) credit terms of a transaction otherwise subject to this act; or
(e) any public utility subject to the regulating
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of
the state of Utah.
(2) A person alleged to have violated this act has
the burden of showing the applicability of this section.
1973
13-11-23.

Other remedies available — Class action only as p r e s c r i b e d by act.
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies
otherwise available for the same conduct under state
or local law, except that a class action relating to a
transaction governed by this act may be brought only
as prescribed by this act.
1973
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
JUDITH MAYORGA, #4630
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
385 - 24th Street, #522
Ogdenf Utah 84401
Telephone: 394-9431
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE WADE,

*

Plaintiff,

*

V.

OCT 2 3 1989
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

LINDA JOBE,

*

Defendant-

*

Civil No. 89-0901383

This matter was tried before the above-entitled Court, the
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, presiding, on September 7, 1989.

The

Couit, having heard the testimony and argiament of the parties and
their witnesses, and having reviewed the file and the applicable
law, How, hereby makes it Findings of Fact as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant rented a house at 2086 Adams Ave., Ogden, Utah,

from the Plaintiff in June of 1988, under an oral agreement.
Defendant was to pay rental in the amount of Three Hundred and
Twenty Five Dollars ($325) per month and a cleaning deposit of One
Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115).
2.

Plaintiff (landlord) is regularly engaged in the business

of lenting properties to tenants.
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3.

The Defendant took occupancy of the premises on July 14,

and had the water service turned on July 15.
4.

Defendant's tenancy was terminated on December 13, 1988,

by a notice from the Ogden City Inspection Division that the
pieinises were unsafe for human occupatioh due to the lack of a
sewer connection and other problems.
5.

The Ogden City Inspection Division subsequently made

another report on January 11, 1989, citing numerous code violations
which were a substantial hazard to the health and safety of the
occupants.

The notice and order of thel Ogden City Inspection

Division indicated that the subject property would be condemned if
the violations were not remedied.
6.

The Ogden City Building Inspector testified that the

pieinises were subject to "dozens" of violations of the Utah Housing
Code which posed substantial dangers to the health and safety of
the occupants, including presence of raw sewage on the sidewalks,
and stagnant water in the basement with a foul odor.
7.

Defendant paid total rents during the five (5) month

peiiod of her occupancy of Seven Hundred ahd Forty Dollars ($740)
plus the One Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115) deposit.
8.

Defendant owed a total of Sixteen Hundred and Twenty Five

Dollars ($1,625) for the five (5) months of her occupancy leaving
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a balance owed to Plaintiff of Seven Hundred and Seventy Dollars
($770) .
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters it
Conclusions of Law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the amount of

Seven Hundred and Seventy Dollars ($770) plus costs.
2.

Defendant was evicted on December 13 by the Ogden City

Inspection Division.
3.

Utah law does not recognize an implied warranty of

habitability for residential rental premises for residential rental
premises.
4.

The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, § 13-11-1 et seq. ,

does not apply to a landlord/tenant agreement.
5.

If the Consumer Sales Practices Act were found to be

applicable to this case, the evidence would not warrant a finding
of any deceptive act or practice on the part of the landlord, as
contemplated by the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
6.

Defendant is not entitled to any offsets in her rental

obligation as a result of problems with the property after she
moved in.

3
A-9

Wade v, Jobe
Ajncnded Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Civil Ho. 890901383
7.

The

Court

concludes

that

alJL

monies

and/or

bonds

deposited by the Plaintiff shall be released to the Plaintiff.
DATED this

[ £[ day of October, 1989J
BY THE COl

RONALD O-V HYDE
District Court Judge
Date Entered
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
JUDITH MAYORGA, 14630
Attorney for Defendant
385 - 24th Street, #522
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 394-9431
III THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE WADE,

°Br*3 1939

*

Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

v.
LINDA JOBE,

*

Defendant.

Civil No. 890901383

The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, NOW, HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiff is granted judgment
against Defendant for the following sums:
1.
a) Unpaid rent
$770.00
b)

Court Costs

15.00

c)

Interest at 10% per annum from Dec. 13,
1989 to date of Judgment

32.00

TOTAL JUDGMENT $817.00
d)

Interest on the total Judgment at
12 % per anuin from the date hereof

1.
All monies and/or bonds deposited by the Plaintiff to the
Court Clerk shall be immediately released to the Plaintiff.
2.
Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this jCf day of October, 1989.

RONALD O. HYDE
(
District Court JudgeJ
^
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78-36-12.

Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant fmm thn tenant's premises in any manner except hy judicial pincers, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not ho prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-30 12.6(2) and letaking the premises and attempting to tent I hem at, a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
1981
78-3(5-12.3.

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1.
78-37-2.
78-37-3.
78-37-4.
78-37-5.

Definitions.
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fform of action — Judgment — Special
execution.
lj)eficiency judgment — Execution.
Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights
barred.
Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys
Sales — When debt due in installments.

